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INTRODUCTION
Amongst its many legacies, the `narrative turn' has reinvigorated critical thinking of the ontology of `the self', and in this regard has propelled auto/biographical studies into the heart of contemporary sociologies of identity/subjectivity. There is little doubt that auto/biography has become an important resource and topic for theorising and conceptualising different selves, how they are constructed and composed from varied socio-political, historical and cultural sites, and how they connect and engage with others, both similarly and differentially located in time and space. Yet, as Plummer (2001) puts it, there may be a `dark side' to this success story with fears that the exponential growth in the production, consumption and academicisation of auto/biographical work reinforces and intensifies what Lasch (1979) describes as a `narcissistic culture' of self-absorbed individuals with no sense of shared morality, collective responsibility or commitment to public life. Such pessimism is further buttressed by a contemporary flirtation with postmodernism, which works to undermine the possibility of political intervention founded on a universal ethics. It seems paradoxical, therefore, to turn to a postmodern analytic to rethink the potential for ethical reflexivity in auto/biographical practice. Suppose we accept as axiomatic the notion of auto/biography as a `technology of the self' in the Foucauldian sense.
This, then, positions auto/biography within a thesis which emphasises the constitution of the self as a project of aesthetic inscription and ethical (self-)formation.
The idea that an aesthetic disposition is ethically indispensable is as intriguing as it is contentious, not least because it challenges the Habermasian notion of the separate spheres of the `cognitive', the `ethico-political' and the `libidinal-aesthetic' (Eagleton, opens up the possibility for realising a different kind of ethical relation to ourselves and others.
AGAINST AESTHETICS
We pay for our commitment to individuality by incurring the dangers of lives floundering in capricious subjectivism, the pursuit of arbitrary whims, the loss of real selves in unrealistic dreams, and by cutting mistakenly the life giving interaction between self-formation and responsible cultivation of our given social and cultural world. Only the future can show whether the price is too high and whether we can live responsibly with the ideal of the self. (Weintraub, 1978: 379) This eloquent observation captures very well the (perceived) socio-cultural dangers of the `autobiographical society'. Yet, at what point does `creative individuality' cease to refine our knowledge and understanding of the world; under what conditions does 'life giving interaction' degenerate into `capricious subjectivism'; and why should these processes be understood as necessarily regressive ones? Equally, what marks the passage from socially accountable practices of `self-formation', `responsible cultivation' and `giving each man his due' to a hedonism based on the self-interested `pursuit of arbitrary whims' and `unrealistic dreams'? It seems to me that the movement to the `dark side' suggested by Weintraub is also represented as a movement across an (imagined) boundary between `truth-seeking rational enquiry'
and `ethico-political discourse' on the one hand, and `aesthetic values' on the other (Norris, 1992: 163) . This positions what could otherwise be construed as the parochial concern of auto/biographical studies, within a wider philosophical debate on the relationship between the cognitive, ethical and aesthetic realms of human experience -in Habermasian terms, the mutually exclusive spheres of science, morality and art.
One of the many contributions of postmodern theories of the aesthetic is to eschew the modernist separation of the spheres and to restore to the centre of socio-political life the affective, sensual and spectacular dimensions of human existence. Such a perspective draws on an explicitly Nietzschean worldview in which the aesthetic attitude governs all spheres of life, including the ethical. As Wolin points out, in
Nietzschean ethics, actions are deemed as ethical if they demonstrate a will or force which is `glorious, sensational or dramatic ….. patterned after a dramaturgical model …(and) valued solely as a performative gesture ' (1986: 74 Emphasis in original) .
Largely regarded as Nietzsche's heir, Foucault's later works on ethics (Foucault, 1984a (Foucault, , 1985 (Foucault, , 1986 (Foucault, , 1989a (Foucault, , 1989b and his elaboration of an `aesthetics of existence', are said to be indicative of his tendency to `pan-aestheticism' and a perspective which …. favors either an attitude of narcissistic self-absorption or one of outwardly directed, aggressive self-aggrandizement. In neither case is there a discernible trace of human solidarity, mutuality or fellow-feeling. Instead the ethical universe of aesthetic decisionism is a Hobbesian state of nature … with a flair for style (Wolin, 1986:85) .
Eagleton, likewise, is highly sceptical of Foucault's ethical theses arguing that from within such a schema `(e)verything should now become aesthetic, Truth, the cognitive, becomes that which satisfies the mind … Morality is converted to a matter of style, pleasure and intuition …. (of) turning oneself into an artifact ' (1990: 368) .
Indeed, as Vintges suggests `(n)otoriously, the issue in the debate around Foucault's work is its lack of an ethics ' (2001: 166 original emphasis) . For Thacker, Foucault `has difficulty with questions of normativity ' (1993: 13) and fails to establish normative criteria for distinguishing between `good' and 'bad' kinds of aesthetic practice. Fraser (1994) accuses Foucault of being a `moral nihilist'; and Eagleton charges him with espousing `a subject-centred morality with a vengeance ' (1990: 394) . More potently, he argues that Foucault's emphasis on the aesthetic conceals brutality and coercive power behind a cloak of beautiful, self-delighting forms; and asks, `(w)hat would a stylish rape look like, precisely? ' (ibid: 394) . At the same time, feminist critics (such as Balbus, 1985; Diamond and Quinby, 1988; Hartsock, 1990; Sawacki, 1991) , keen to apply Foucault's ethics to questions of `aesthetic embodiment' -dieting, exercise and body-building, for example -argue that such `self-surveillance is a form of obedience to patriarchy' (Bartky, 1988: 81) , and conclude that Foucault crucially fails to address how normative judgements of self-fashioned, aestheticised bodies are always-already produced within a field of power relations. This is similar to Dews' complaint that `Foucault wishes to avoid judging power-knowledge complexes from a normative standpoint ' (1989: 37); and, again, Best and Kellner (1991) 
object to
Foucault's inattention to structures of domination, hegemony and inequality, claiming that the aesthetic turn encourages a `micropolitics of desire' rather than collective forms of resistance guided by an ethics of social justice.
On these readings, the boundary between the aesthetic domain and other spheres of life is completely erased; and under conditions of this kind of aesthetic imperialism, ethical convention and political obligation are repressed, expelled and then banished altogether. As a framework for thinking about and responding to the dangers of auto/biography's narcissistic `dark side', Foucault (it seems) offers us only a one way ticket to an auto/biographical world of spectacular drama and grandiose sentiments in which auto/biography per se would be nothing more than a narrativised, personal soundbite. However, this is to read Foucault narrowly and in a way which glosses over the finer points of his thesis which, far from representing aesthetics as the Other to ethics (and cognition), makes a persuasive theoretical case for thinking about their dialogical and dialectical interrelationship. My point of departure here is Bennett's (1996) very persuasive defence of Foucault, in which she examines the various conceptual elements of the charge of `aestheticization' as it has been levelled against him, and finds his critics wanting on a number of counts.
MUST WE BURN FOUCAULT?
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In the first place, Bennett takes issue with the particular configuration of the `aesthetic' which informs the complaint of `pan-aestheticism'. In Eagleton (1990) , Wolin (1986) and Norris (1992) , she argues, the `aesthetic' is invoked as a discourse of modernity, `as the province of a reactive, undisciplined sensuality ' (1996: 654) , and as `an autonomous "realm" whose criteria of value are nonrational, amoral, and However, the key point here is that while Foucault recognises that ethics may refer to prescribed rules of action, ethical conduct cannot be simply read off from the moral code associated with it -what is crucial is the `manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code' (Foucault, 1985: 26 my emphasis) . In short, moral principles are ethically insufficient 3 ; referring to Greco-Roman nomoi (law and customs), Foucault argues that `more important than the content of the law and its conditions of application was the attitude that caused one to respect them ' (1985: 31 my emphasis) . Here, again, we encounter Foucault's emphasis on sensibility-formation as the key dynamic of ethical practice wherein 'there is … no forming of the ethical subject without "modes of subjectivation" and an "ascetics" or "practices of the self" that support them' (ibid: 28). On this analysis, auto/biographical practice, as an archetypal `technology of the self', is indispensable to ethics and lies at the heart of the formation of an aesthetico-ethical sensibility which, far from negating the moral code, subjects it to qualification, problematisation and critique. There is no `dark side' to auto/biography in this formula, inhabited by a `capricious subjectivism' and driven by the `pursuit of arbitrary whims', so much as a reflexive `little space between morality and ethics' (Connolly, 1998: 111 concludes that `(m)odern man …. is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself' (ibid: 42).
It is perhaps unfortunate that Foucault uses dandyism to illustrate a contemporary ethical-sensibility, as it has been invariably read as demonstrative of his preference for theatricality as a guiding principle of ethical action. This prompts Bennett (1996) to highlight a particular strand of critique -associated primarily with Wolin (1986 Wolin ( , 1992 -which berates Foucauldian ethics for promoting not the content of ethical choice, but its dramatic and spectacular effects. For Wolin, such an ethical position offers only one choice, that `of a glorious life which rides roughshod over the trammels of social respectability and convention ' (1986: 81) . From this perspective, Foucault's aesthetics of existence are re-interpreted as `performative gesture' (ibid: 74),
'provocative actions', `narcissistic self-absorption' or `outwardly directed, aggressive self-aggrandizement' (ibid: 85); and his emphasis on critical reflexivity is re-read as as a `micropolitics of desire' (Best and Kellner, 1991: 290) centred on the body and its pleasures. As Bennett puts it, `Foucault's project of crafting a sensibility is reduced to an unreflective submission to the body. Foucault's aesthetics is thus stripped of its ascesis ' (1996: 662) .
The representation of Foucault's ethics as a self-centred, affective and embodied kind of vitalism is completely contrary to Foucault's insistence that ethics requires a process of reflection not only about the relationship of self with self, but also of the relationship one has with others -more about this below. In an interview in 1984,
Foucault makes the important link between freedom, ethics and reflection, asserting that:
… it is obvious that by liberating our desire that we will learn to conduct ourselves
ethically … for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom …. Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection (Foucault, 1994a: 284) .
Elsewhere, Foucault fleshes out some of the key principles of this reflective process;
for example, in Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual, Foucault describes himself as a `moralist' and lists `three elements in his "morals" … refusal, curiosity, innovation ' (1988b: 1) . By refusal, he enjoins us not to accept anything in our culture, social arrangements and experiences as self-evident, fixed or definitive. Refusal is helped by attributes of curiosity and innovation; `I dream of a new age of curiosity' (Foucault, 1994b: 325) , he says, regarding curiosity as the capacity and concern to find strangeness in all those things in life which are seen as familiar, traditional, necessary, fundamental and important. The corollary to curiosity is innovation, an ability to perpetually seek out new things to think about and imagine, and never resting content on acquired knowledge and beliefs. This is an explicitly Nietzschean position: in Nietzsche's words, `(w)e have to learn to think differently -in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently' (Nietzsche, 1982: 104, aphorism 103, original emphasis). In addition, Foucault regards refusal, curiosity and innovation as motivated by what he refers to as the `danger principle'; in his elaboration of a genealogy of ethics, he describes such a disposition as the wellspring of our ethical choices:
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous… If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do…. I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger (1984a: 343).
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it may be the case that the `dark side' of auto/biography is looking far less gloomy than at outset: but even if we accept that the reflexive, sensibility-forming and innovative qualities of reading/writing auto/biography have considerable ethical purchase, how far do Foucauldian ethics support `the life giving interaction between self-formation and responsible cultivation of our given social and cultural world' (Weintraub, 1978: 379) ? Put another way, can
Foucault's ethical analytic also be pressed into the service of collective action, coalitions of resistance, political alliances and a shared commitment to social justice?
Bennett points out how Foucault's materialist critics are especially vexed by this issue. Eagleton, for example, claims that `Foucault's vigorously self-mastering individual remains wholly monadic. Society is just an assemblage of autonomous self-disciplining agents, with no sense that their self-realisation might flourish within bonds of mutuality ' (1990: 393) . Best and Kellner (1991) and Callinicos (1989) accuse Foucault of failing to position his ethics within a wider analysis of the socioeconomic and cultural conditions of late modernity. However, Bennett counters these criticisms by first, arguing that Foucault is not only insistent but consistent in his view that power is the condition of possibility of any form of subjectivity, and there can be no process of subjectivation outside of a regime of power. Secondly, in response to Eagleton's specific comment that Foucault has `no sense' of the connection between self-formation, mutuality and collective action, Bennett reminds us of the impossibility of self-realization given its embeddedness within social relations. Whatever the ideal of caring for or knowing the self, Foucault acknowledges that such a task is performed within a web of social constraints which always fail in their attempt to prevent `intersubjective bonds likely to disrupt the regime' (Bennett, 1996: 660 Bennett, then, concurs that within his ethical schema, Foucault's `aesthetics of existence' are best understood as `one of the means through which we improve the quality and generosity of our connectedness to others ' (1996: 661) . This point is very persuasively elaborated in Connolly's (1998) 4 essay in which he draws on Foucault's (1984a) genealogy of ethics to suggest four key dimensions of an ethical sensibility which, in combination, suggest the form which a Foucauldian `ethico-politico spirituality' might take (ibid: 119). Firstly, Connolly talks of our propensity to unsettle the ontological necessity, inevitability and purity of established self/other dualities (such as identity/difference; innocent/guilty; normality/abnormality); secondly, he suggests the active cultivation of a capacity to recognise the ambiguity and contingency of one's identity; thirdly, he enjoins us to develop a generous sensibility to one's difference from others, and to understand how that difference informs the definition of self-identity; and fourthly, he encourages the exploration of new possibilities in social relations opened up by a genealogy of the self.
AUTO/BIOGRAPHY AND COLLECTIVE LIFE
Despite the foregoing, I am still not convinced that auto/biographical work needs The transformation of the media at the end of the twentieth century is welldocumented and constitutes one of the most important social changes currently facing global societies (Miller, 1993 (Miller, , 1998 Stevenson, 1999; Lull, 2001; Kellner, 1995 Kellner, , 2003 However, this utopianism finds its nemesis in a Baudrillardian perspective which talks of the advent of a `hyperreality' wherein the masses, caught up in a universe of simulation and multi-media massage, seek nothing more than spectacle, fantasy, diversion, entertainment and escape -an experience of pure effect and affect without content or meaning -see, for example, Baudrillard 1983 Baudrillard , 1993 Baudrillard , 1994 . It is the kind of pessimistic stance taken up by Gabler who comments that in an era of highly mediatised cultural forms, we create our own lives as a film in which we become `at once performance artists in, and audiences for, a grand ongoing show' (1998: 4).
For Gabler, the practice of life-writing is transformed into an aesthetic process of entertainment acted out for the benefit of readers/audiences, and is reflective of the scripts of the wider media culture, its role models, fashion types, styles and looks.
Under these dystopian conditions there is (almost) no prospect for an auto/biographical politics marked by relations of resistance, coalition and mutuality.
Indeed, to all intents and purposes, the harbingers of the `dark side' would appear to have been right all along.
The matter, however, cannot rest there. Borrowing from Kellner's (1994 -see also Best and Kellner, 1991) critique of Baudrillard, the pan-aestheticism of `hyperreality' mistakes a trend for a finality; it exaggerates the extent to which postmodern culture is modelled by processes of simulation; it is a thesis which would be more at home in a work of science fiction; and, above all, it constructs readers (viewers, listeners, consumers) as stupefied, passive, non-discriminating, cultural dopes. On the other hand, though McLuhanism may be overly optimistic, there is a refusal here to turn the readership of auto/biographical texts to stone, and it celebrates the active, intersubjective and inherently political nature of reading practice. Nonetheless, there is no further deconstruction of the `global village' of readers nor any account of how the `ethicality' of auto/biographical work is realised within (and through) the contingency of reading practice. Perhaps, then, all that is required to counter the (alleged) drift to narcissism and self-absorption, is to acknowledge and understand the ways in which ethical relations are forged by, in and through our contingent `readerly' encounters with auto/biographical material. Foucault may (still) be dispensable after all.
READING AUTO/BIOGRAPHY
(Within auto/biography) …reading remains invisible as a topic for serious theoretical discussion. Reading is instead taken as a pre-theoretical given, a transparent act in relation to a totally active text which is apparently productive of one obvious and incontrovertible reading. What is needed instead is a discussion of reading as an active engagement with a text and so as a viewpoint contingent upon the epistemological and ontological position of a reader and thus of her autobiography, such as has taken place within ethnomethodologically-informed sociology (Stanley, 1992 : 100 Original emphasis).
Stanley is an exception to the analytical blindspot which she draws attention to in this passage. Throughout her book, The Auto/biographical I, she explicitly engages with the activity of reading, conceptualising both the practices and the person of the auto/biographical reader(s). In these pages we are introduced to `active readers, knowledgeable readers ' (1992: 116) who bring to the text their own `auto/biographies and the tools, means and knowledges these provide' (ibid: 84). There is a greater sense of a division (and balance) of auto/biographical labour in this perspective; it is not a question of de-centring either the text (or its author) in favour of the reader, so much as recognising how auto/biographical texts facilitate their interaction and serve as socio-discursive prisms or conduits through which ethical relationships between writing selves and reading others may be negotiated and formed. However, there is no guarantee that such relationships will aspire to bonds of mutuality or coalitions of resistance. As Stanley rightly points out:
We may be textually persuaded, cajoled, led and misled; but we can, and we do, also scrutinise and analyse, puzzle and ponder, resist and reject. Readers, then, form a discriminating audience, one with its own understandings; and it is a fragmented audience … a large number of people who multiply engage in its largely solitary virtues and vices (ibid: 131).
This quotation neatly captures the epistemological insights of a broad interdisciplinary literature which talks of the relationship between writers and readers and how this is mediated by particular and socially-contextualised readings of the text. While different theorists have approached the issue in different ways, depending on the kinds of texts examined -including film, best-selling novels, television drama, newspaper reports, television documentaries, academic ethnographies -they share the view that connections between the writing self and reading other are anchored in a text which reflects readers' `own frame of reference' so that they come to `share the perspective of the text' (Atkinson, 1990: 15) . Eco sums this up well: he states, `to make his (sic) text communicative, the author has to assume that the ensemble of codes he relies upon is the same as that shared by his possible reader ' (1979: 7) .
Put another way, he argues that narrative strategies `make us fond' by drawing on `the common opinions shared by the majority of readers' (ibid: 161); they invite cooperation by appealing to shared values; by deploying a `common frame' and an `intertextual frame' of references and inferences (ibid: 20-21); and by mobilising a `patrimony of knowledge ' (Eco, 1972 cited in Sparks, 1992 . As Atkinson (1990: 2) has argued, `we read, and read into the text based on our own background knowledge and assumptions'; while Freund (1987) suggests that a text has gaps, and in the act of reading, the reader clarifies the ambiguities -`the reader is free to fill in the blanks but is at the same time constrained by the patterns supplied in the text;
the text proposes and instructs, and the reader disposes or constructs' (Freund, 1987 : 142 cited in Rosenau, 1992 . These insights confirm reading practice as an active process which involves a continual search for coherence between the narrative and other dimensions of readers' beliefs, consciousness and values.
Where there is no coherence, then readers may adopt either an `oppositional position', and retotalize the narrative within an alternative frame of reference (Hall, 1992: 138) , or a `negotiated position' which is `shot through with contradictions' (ibid: 137). What is emphasised here is the ideological import of narrative texts, and therefore their implications to the reproduction of existing power relations including, within this, a reinforcement of relations of resistance.
Despite the prominence of these theoretical perspectives within narrative studies and notwithstanding my own use of them elsewhere (Campbell, 2004a (Campbell, , 2004b , I have reservations on their analytical value to questions of `ethicality'. While readers may be conceptualised as active participants in their connectivity with authors/writers, and the contingency of their socio-political locations is acknowledged, there is no potential within these frameworks for thinking about movements or shifts in readers'
originating consciousness and dispositions. Rather, readers are supposed as preformed individuals, always-already disposed to a particular reading; ethical relations appear to be fixed, static and inert with no possibility that readers' ethical positions could (somehow) change and new or different self/other relations be forged.
AN ETHICS OF BECOMING
This leads us, then, back into the heart of Foucauldian territory where ethicality is not a matter of subscribing to or being tolerant of a particular authorial value-position, but is a dynamic process of sensibility-formation which starts as a problematisation of ourselves as readers of others' auto/biographical accounts. For Connolly, tolerance may be an admirable quality, but it is suggestive of a benevolence to others amidst the stability of our own identities; what is required is an `ethos of critical responsiveness' (1999: 62) which involves active work on our current identities in order to modify the terms of our relationship to others. Such an ethos foregrounds the affective forces of ethical experience; it is an analytic which is less interested in forms of being -that is, being persuaded by, resistant to, rejecting and/or tolerant of difference -and more concerned with those visceral and moving encounters which initiate other possibilities for subjectivity and intersubjectivity, an aesthetic response which Connolly refers to as a `movement of becoming' (ibid: 57-62). Connolly suggests that a `politics of becoming' is (even) locatable within the highly polarised debates surrounding capital punishment where there is little scope for a compromise position which satisfies the different moral standpoints of those who are pro-and those who are anti-the death penalty. However, the opposing fundamentalisms generated by capital punishment, whether represented as political, moral, cultural or symbolic dichotomies, are also played out on a visceral register of experience and are energised by affective, aesthetic and emotional forces which are as important for our ethical encounters with state-sanctioned execution as are categorical imperatives grounded in morality, law and reason. Yet, and ironically, this aesthetico-ethical dimension is continually suppressed as if by its very articulation rational-moral perspectives on capital punishment, on either side of the debate, would be lost forever. At a time when some penal activists suggest that the public is no longer Frontline series on 9 April, 1996, was quick to generate viewers' comments leading to the online publication of both the programme scripts and its research materials In a speech which formed part of a community discussion on the death penalty,
Sister Prejean reflected on Tim Robbins' transformation of her book into film; she said: Thus, to celebrate and embrace an aesthetics of existence is not to abandon ethics and reason to the wind but is to enable alternative ways of living together to flourish.
The aesthetic in this schema does not contaminate or colonize the ethical so much as subject it to scrutiny and qualification; in other words, the aesthetic provides the critical leverage to question our sense of self-identity and to foster a sensibility to our difference from others, thereby encouraging new social and political relations to develop. A third effect of repositioning Foucault's technologies of the self within the centre ground of political and ethical life is their invigorating impact on how (and where) we look to foster socio-cultural relations of mutuality, coalition and alliance.
That is, if we accept Foucauldian ethics qua ethics, rather than regard them as an incitement to pan-aetheticism, it permits us to jettison wellworn debates on the relative merits of universality over particularity in ethical principles, in favour of a more imaginative approach to community living and civic direction. So, rather than look to canonical maxims, moral injunctions and legal codes for normative guidance, our ethical citizenship is prompted by curiosity, innovation, refusal and a sense of danger, most especially in terms of a problematisation of our-selves and a questioning of the (self-)identities to which we have become attached. It is precisely this kind of ethos which is encouraged by the `autobiographical society'. Thus, and finally, far from promoting a narcissistic culture, the proliferation of auto/biography contributes to what Foucault describes as `an overabundance of things: fundamental, terrible, wonderful, funny, insignificant, and crucial at the same time' (Foucault, 1994b: 325) . In this case we should embrace the emergence of a globalised, and largely aetheticised cultural and digital media which not only permit different technologies of the self to flourish, but which also enable us to `act as intermediaries between this mass of things and this thirst for (ethical) knowledge' (ibid: 325).
NOTES
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Scottish and Northern Narratives Network Conference, University of Edinburgh, 9 December 2005. I am grateful to conference participants for their helpful comments and feedback on the paper. I am also very grateful to the anonymous reviewers of Cultural Sociology for their constructive contributions to this article.
2. This is taken directly from Vintges (2001) 6. These can be accessed at: www.imdb.com/title/tt0112818/usercomments 7. PBS is a US public affairs television company 8. These can be accessed at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/angel/ 9. The character of Matthew Poncelet, played by actor Sean Penn, is largely understood to be a composite of the biographies of the first two men Sister Helen
Prejean counselled on death row -Elmo Patrick Sonnier and Robert Lee Willie.
According to Buchanan (1996) , Poncelet captures Sonnier's crime and Willie's character. (1995) 
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